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Introduction. Many studies have reported that individuals with schizophrenia (SZ)
may have impaired social cognition, resulting in communication disorders and
theory of mind (ToM) impairments. However, the classical tasks used to assess
impaired ToM ability are too complex. The aim of this study was to assess ToM
ability using both a classical task and a referential communication task that
reproduces a ‘‘natural’’ conversation situation.
Methods. Thirty-one participants with schizophrenia and 29 matched healthy
participants were tested individually on a referential communication task and on a
standard ToM task.
Results and Conclusion. The main results showed that SZ participants had
difficulties using reference markers and attributing mental states in both ToM
tasks. Contrary to healthy participants, they exhibited a tendency to ineffectively
mark the information they used (indefinite articles for old information and/or
definite articles for new information) and had problems using information they
shared with the experimenter.
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INTRODUCTION
Social cognition includes Theory of Mind (ToM) ability, among other skills.
ToM is the ability to form representations of other people’s mental states
(e.g., intentions, beliefs, shared knowledge) and to use these representations
to understand, predict, and judge their statements and behaviours (Premack
& Woodruff, 1978). A deficit in social cognition, including a ToM
impairment, is a core feature of schizophrenia and is a significant factor
in the social isolation experienced by many individuals with schizophrenia
(SZ). Indeed, the ability to quickly process social stimuli is essential for
social interactions, and problems in this area can impact family relationships
and work and school behaviour.
Several studies have shown that SZ individuals have ToM impairments
(Brune, 2005; Champagne-Lavau, Stip, & Joanette, 2006; Harrington,
Siegert, & McClure, 2005; Lee, Farrow, Spence, & Woodruff, 2004).
However, a review of the literature concerning ToM impairments in SZ
(Harrington, Siegert, & McClure, 2005) emphasises the complexity of the
processes studied and the inherent difficulty of studying them. Indeed,
ToM is typically operationalised in research as participants’ ability to
understand false beliefs (first- and second-order beliefs such as I believe
Paul thinks it’s raining) in complex stories (Happe, Brownell, & Winner,
1999) or in cartoons (Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Besche, & Widlocher, 1997).
Except for recent studies (Russell, Reynaud, Herba, Morris, & Corcoran,
2006; Stewart, Corcoran, & Drake, 2008), all studies of ToM in SZ have
used the same tasks, such as the hinting task (Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith,
1995) or the Faux-Pas task (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, &
Plaisted, 1999). The latter task, for example, requires a second-order false
belief paradigm (belief about the belief of a protagonist in the story), with
an empathetic appreciation of the protagonist’s emotional state (knowledge
of emotions). Because most of the tasks used to assess ToM are artificial
and very complex, they create a cognitive overload that might impair ToM
performance in SZ individuals (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). Given that SZ
individuals generally show various impairments in other cognitive domains
(including memory and executive functions; Stip, 2006), it becomes difficult
to tease out the role of ToM versus cognitive impairment, as evaluated by
these tasks. Some studies showing ToM difficulties have tried to control
for the influence of cognitive functioning in ToM (see Brune, 2005;
Harrington, Siegert, & McClure, 2005, for a review). Indeed, some authors
have controlled for general cognitive functioning by taking into account
cognitive variables such as attention (Randall, Corcoran, Day, & Bentall,
2003), executive functioning (Brune, 2005; Brune, Abdel-Hamid,
Lehmkamper, & Sonntag, 2007; Champagne-Lavau, Charest, Blouin, &
Rodriguez, 2008; Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles, & van Os, 2003; Langdon,
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Coltheart, Ward, & Catts, 2001; Langdon, Coltheart, Ward, & Catts, 2002;
Mitchley, Berber, Gray, Brooks, & Livingston, 1998), autobiographical
memory (Corcoran & Frith, 2003), and general picture sequencing
(Harrington, Langdon, Siegert, & McClure, 2005; Langdon, Coltheart, &
Ward, 2006; Langdon et al., 1997, 2002).
The results obtained by McCabe, Leudar, and Antaki (2004) suggested
that factors such as task demands might influence SZ patients’ performance.
The authors were interested in the evaluation of ToM in SZ individuals in a
conversational situation. Contrary to what is reported in the literature, they
showed that SZ participants exhibited no difficulties in attributing mental
states (e.g., intent, belief) to the clinicians with whom they interacted. This
study is relevant because it was the only one, to our knowledge, that assessed
ToM in an interaction between clinicians and SZ participants. However, this
study had some weaknesses. There was no healthy control group, and the
conversational analysis the authors performed on the conversations they
recorded was not explained. The authors’ conclusions seemed to be based on
the interpretation of particular conversational sequences described as
reporting an intact ToM in some SZ participants. The criteria used for
this interpretation were not described. Similarly, no information was
provided concerning the sequence selection, and the choice of some patients
rather than others. Accordingly, the analyses seemed to be intuitive and
interpretive, whereas they should have been based on predetermined
objective measures quantified in the corpus collected during the interactions.
In addition, the SZ participants in this study were not tested with a classical
ToM task and their performances were not compared to those of a healthy
control group. Thus, no conclusion can be reached regarding whether this
SZ group did or did not have ToM difficulty.
Others studies have used original methodology involving participants to
verbally describe ToM scenarios (Langdon et al., 1997; Russell et al., 2006).
For example, in Langdon et al. (1997), SZ participants were submitted to
picture sequencing and storytelling tasks that required participants to infer
causal mental states in story characters. In a second experiment, the
authors also examined ratios of different types of mental state terms used
by the participants to tell stories about completed sequences. Results
showed that SZ participants were impaired in monitoring their own and
others’ mental states. Using a paradigm that takes into account the
dynamic nature of complex social interactions, Russell et al. (2006) showed
that patients were less likely than healthy controls to use mentalising terms
to describe ToM scenes and generally showed lower levels of accuracy.
Similarly, Stewart et al. (2008) recently used a request/response task which
was a dialogue-based empirical task to assess alignment of politeness and
ability to infer knowledge of characters. This task presented participants
with a fictional conversation and required them to choose the appropriate
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conversational reply from choices. Results indicated mentalising impair-
ments in SZ participants while they had intact alignment skills. Although
these studies did not involve communication per se, they led to a new step
towards natural communication in the assessment of ToM ability in
schizophrenia.
To sum up, according to this brief literature review, it is clear that SZ
individuals may present ToM impairments when they are tested with
classical ToM tasks (artificial tasks that involve cognitive overload) as well
as with ‘‘more natural’’ tasks requiring them to verbalise ToM scenarios.
However, no relevant study has determined whether such an impairment is
present in natural communication. Indeed, the tasks used to date did not
really reflect the reality of ToM ability in social interactions. They were also
poorly adapted insofar as they increased the cognitive load.
This paper examines ToM in schizophrenia with an original psycholin-
guistic paradigm*the referential communication paradigm (Chantraine,
Joanette, & Ska, 1998), involving interaction in a natural conversation
situation. The concept of referential communication enables one to assess
how interlocutors who are conversing about how to arrange a set of figures
take into account, or fail to take into account, shared knowledge. In this
referential communication task, participants must produce discriminating
information that will enable the experimenter to identify certain target
figures. If the task is repeated (several trials) with the same interlocutors and
the same figures, an evolution of the referential negotiation process will
generally be observed, meaning that there is a significant increase in
communicative efficacy. Linguistic markers of referential cohesion, such as
indefinite (a mountain) or definite (the mountain) descriptions, play a
primary role in the construction of shared knowledge between interlocutors.
During a conversation, the interlocutors use these cohesion markers as
surface cues to guide each other in the coconstruction of a coherent mental
representation of speech (Cornish, 1999; Fossard & Rigalleau, 2005). The
use of these markers reveals the knowledge that the speaker assumes that the
listener shares with him/her. These markers also help the listener to
understand the speaker’s intentions during a conversation. A model such
as Ariel’s accessibility marking scale (1990, 1996) claims indeed that the use
of any particular marker of reference (indefinite, definite descriptions,
pronouns, etc.), far from being a random choice, is closely connected to
the level of accessibility that the referent is assumed to have in the listener’s
mental model of the discourse under construction. This model provides a
formal basis, making it possible to justify and predict the presence or use of
a particular marker. Then, when the referent targeted is assumed to be
accessible enough in the listener’s mental discourse representation, a definite
description (the mountain), marking an old, already known information,
should be used. On the other hand, an indefinite description (a mountain) is
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more expected to introduce new information, not already shared with the
listener. Therefore, these linguistic elements represent relevant and rigorous
markers to determine SZ patients’ ability to judge, understand, and attribute
mental states such as belief or shared knowledge (ToM) in a natural
conversation.
In the referential communication task, the shared knowledge (or
common ground) is provided by the physical context (in this case, the
identical sets of figures) and, more importantly, by the history of previous
exchanges between the two interlocutors. According to the collaborative
model of reference (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), the speaker assumes that
the knowledge he/she uses (the common ground) is shared by the listener
and will allow the most appropriate formulation of the message. The first
trial entails a fairly complex exchange with several descriptions, whereas
this is not necessary in the following trials. The initial speaker’s referential
utterance may not be perfectly clear. From one trial to the next, the two
interlocutors (experimenter and participant) come to mutually agree on
common references (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Garrod & Anderson,
1987). Within the context of the interactive alignment model proposed by
Pickering and Garrod (2004), this agreement results from an automatic
alignment process of the different levels of linguistic representation that the
interlocutors develop as the dialogue proceeds. As linguistic elements
accumulate, mental discourse representations (also called ‘‘situational
models’’) of both interlocutors are refined and become aligned, permitting
a mutual understanding. Consequently, the number of words used by the
participants and the number of speaking turns usually decrease. Indefinite
descriptions (as in ‘‘a fish’’) are progressively replaced by definite
descriptions on which an agreement was reached between the interlocutors
(as in ‘‘the fish’’). Expressions of uncertainty (‘‘a kind of’’, ‘‘it looks like’’)
tend to be omitted and routines (particular use of an expression during a
particular interaction) develop (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Ambiguity
dissipates, the interlocutors agree on the proposed interpretation and they
mark this agreement linguistically by the use of the definite reference
(definite description). When a participant makes such a definite reference,
he/she tries to establish with the interlocutor the mutual belief that the
interlocutor has understood the reference before continuing the conversa-
tion. Whereas indefinite articles are linguistic forms used to point out new
information, definite articles are markers used to retrieve old references
that have already been introduced in speech. They are used by participants
to indicate that they expect the coming reference to be known by the
interlocutor. This phenomenon shows the construction of shared knowl-
edge by the interlocutors.
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It appears, then, that the referential communication task is an original
option for studying ToM ability in natural conversation situations in
schizophrenia.1 In addition to the objective linguistic measures and the
limited demands on cognitive resources, this referential communication
task offers a considerable advantage over free conversation by lessening
interference from autobiographical or episodic memory problems as the
speaker is requested to describe static, visually presented items (e.g.,
tangrams). Furthermore, the task involves social interaction (which is
collaborative since the participant has to help the experimenter) and the
correction of possible misunderstandings signalled by the experimenter.
The aim of this study was to determine whether SZ individuals always
present an impairment of ToM reasoning in a natural communication
situation, in contrast to classical tasks, which are known to be very complex
and resource demanding. To this end, a referential communication task
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) was used to address attribution and
comprehension of mental states, such as shared knowledge, in a natural
communication situation. A classical nonverbal ToM task (Sarfati et al.,
1997) was also used to measure the task effect.
If the ToM impairments previously evidenced in SZ individuals were task
dependent, SZ participants would be expected to perform worse than
healthy control (HC) participants on a classical ToM task (Sarfati et al.,
1997) but as well as HC participants on the referential communication task.
By contrast, if SZ individuals’ ToM impairments were not task dependent,
they would be expected to perform worse than HC participants on both
tasks.
METHOD
Participants
Inclusion criteria were a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia with no
medical or neurological diseases and no concomitant Axis I or Axis II
disorders. Thirty-one schizophrenia outpatients and 29 healthy volunteers
matched for age and educational level participated in the study after signing
a detailed informed consent. All participants were native French-speakers
and signed the consent form approved by the local ethic committee. The
mean duration of illness in the patients was 16.2 years (SD99.5). The
patients’ mean age at the time of assessment was 42.0 years (SD99.3) and
the mean years of education amounted to 12.8 (SD92.2).The SZ and
1 Authors such as Docherty, Cohen, Nienow, Dinzeo, and Dangelmaier (2003), Docherty, Hall,
Gordinier, and Cutting (2000), and Rochester and Martin (1979) have shown an inadequate use of
reference markers in the discourse of patients with schizophrenia.
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control groups did not differ significantly with regard to age, t(58)0.23,
p.05, educational level, t(58)1.39, p.05, or IQ, measured by the
NART (Nelson, 1982), t(58)1.10, p.05. Patients were stabilised on one
or more antipsychotic medications. Patients received antipsychotics in the
following doses, expressed as mean9SD: olanzapine (n8) 23.5 mg915.8;
risperidone (n4) 6.0 mg91.8; quetiapine (n3) 800.0 mg9458.3;
clozapine (n10) 363.9 mg9 201.2, six patients received polypharmacy
with risperidone (three clozapine and three quetiapine). Refractory patients
who received clozapine were stable with the prescribed medication. The
demographic and clinical data are summarised in Table 1. Psychiatric
symptoms were measured with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
(PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987).
Measures
All participants were tested individually over one session 1 hour long in a
quiet room. Tasks were administered to all participants in random order.
Theory of Mind measures
Comic-strip task: Attribution of intentions to others (Sarfati et al.,
1997). The task designed by Sarfati et al. was used to assess ToM without
language. This task is composed of a series of 28 short comic strips, each of
which represents a sequence of three pictures. Each comic strip shows a
character performing an action, motivated by an easily recognisable
volitional mental state (desire and intention). After viewing the comic strips,
participants are asked to select, as quickly as possible, the answer card most
likely to be the last drawing in the comic strip from among the three
TABLE 1
Demographic and clinical data on individuals with schizophrenia and healthy
control participants
Schizophrenia Healthy control
Mean SD Mean SD p-value
Age 42.0 9.4 42.6 10.6 .819
Educational level 12.8 2.2 13.7 2.9 .171
Gender (male/female) 20/11 16/13
NART 45.4 9.6 42.5 8.1 .275
Duration of illness 16.2 9.5
PANSS (positive) 18.0 4.2
PANSS (negative) 20.1 4.6
PANSS (general) 38.6 6.4
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presented. The different answer cards are presented in random order.
Participants must understand the characters’ volitional mental state to
correctly complete each comic strip. One card is the correct answer, which
provides an appropriate ending in light of the character’s mental state;
another card depicts a very frequent everyday action; and a third card is
pictorially very similar to the last picture in the story. These two last cards
have no plausible link with the story in view of its contextual information
and the character’s mental state.
The dependent variable is the number of correct answer cards chosen.
Referential communication task. Stimuli were composed of five geo-
metric figures from the tangram set (an ancient Chinese game; Chantraine
et al., 1998). They have no a priori names and participants have to find a
way to refer to them. The task was developed with two levels of complexity,
depending on the type of tangram used, in order to determine whether
more or less complex figures influence SZ participants’ performance (see
Figure 1). Indeed, Isaac and Clark (1987) and Hupet, Seron, and
Chantraine (1991) have shown that the relative complexity of referents
affects the referring procedure. In other words, when figures are difficult to
name, more words and more speaking turns are required.
In our study, participant and experimenter were separated by an opaque
screen in order to avoid nonverbal communication (gestures). The partici-
pant received the five figures in a given order on a sheet of paper. This order
was unknown to the experimenter. The experimenter had the same set of
figures but on individual cards that were scattered randomly. The participant
was asked to describe the five figures from left to right in such a way as to
help the experimenter arrange them in the same order. Each participant was
told that both players had identical figures and that they would play the
game four times, each time with a new order of the figures. Thus, the
Figure 1. Tangrams used at the first and second levels of complexity.
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participant had to provide discriminating information in order to enable the
experimenter to identify each figure. The experimenter never suggested
definite references concerning figures until the participant did. The task was
repeated four times (the four trials) with the same partner and the same
material. The order of the five figures given to the participant was changed
in each trial. At the end of each trial, the participant and the experimenter
checked to find out whether the experimenter’s arrangement was similar to
that of the participant. Two experimenters interacted with participants and
the testing order of SZ and HC participants was randomised. Speech
productions were recorded and later transcribed verbatim.
Scoring. For each trial (first, second, third, fourth), a linguist (GM) who
was blind to group membership, measured: (1) the total number of words
produced; (2) the number of speaking turns (defined as series of speech with
no intervention by the partner); (3) the number of indefinite references
(indefinite articles like ‘‘an angel’’); and (4) the number of definite references
(use of the definite article irrespective of the length of the noun phrase).
Given that the total number of words varied across the participants, a ratio
of indefinite references/total words and a ratio of definite references/total
words were calculated. Misunderstandings were measured with the number
of requests for clarification (e.g., request for more information, suggestion of
a different way of describing the figure) and answers to these requests. The
analysis of misunderstanding incidents due to confounding or irrelevant
information also evidences specific impairment in the ability to adopt the
experimenter’s perspective.
Statistical analyses were performed on these dependent variables.
RESULTS
Unpaired t-tests were performed on the comic-strip data while analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) were performed on the referential communication data.
Theory of Mind assessment
Comic-strip task
Unpaired t-tests performed on the comic-strip score revealed that SZ
participants performed significantly worse than HC participants on this
task, t(58)4.09, pB.0001.
Referential communication task
First level of complexity. A 24 repeated measure ANOVA for Group
(SZ, HC)Trial (first trial, second trial, third trial, fourth trial) was
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performed on each dependent variable: total number of words, number of
speaking turns, ratio number of indefinite references/total words, and ratio
number of definite references/total words.
For the total number of words, the results showed a main effect of trial,
F(3, 174)52.48, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the differences
between the first trial and the other trials were significant ( pB.0001). The
differences between the second trial and the third trial ( pB.004) and
between the third trial and the fourth trial ( pB.01) were also significant,
meaning that the total number of words produced by participants decreased
continuously from the first trial to the fourth trial. There was no main effect
of group, F(1, 58)0.37, p.05. The GroupTrial interaction was not
significant, F(3, 174)1.35, p.05.
For the total number of speaking turns, the results showed a main effect
of group, F(1, 58)4.57, pB.05; interactions involving SZ participants
contained more speaking turns than interactions with HC participants.
There was a main effect of trial, F(3, 174)42.71, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD
revealed that the differences were significant ( pB.0001) between the first
trial and the other three trials. The GroupTrial interaction was not
significant, F(3, 174)0.88, p.05 (cf. Table 2).
For the ratio indefinite references/total words, the results showed a main
effect of group, F(1, 58)17.67, pB.0001. The ratio was higher for SZ
participants than for HC participants. There was also a main effect of trial,
F(3, 174)18.09, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the ratio was higher
in the first trial than in the second, third, or fourth trials ( pB.0001).
Differences were found between the second and third trials ( pB.05), and the
second and fourth trials ( pB.05). No difference was found between the
third and fourth trials ( p.05). The GroupTrial interaction was also
significant, F(3, 174)7.89, pB.0001. This interaction was decomposed by
trial. There was no significant difference between the two groups on the first
trial, F(1, 58)0.85, p.05, but differences were found between the two
groups on the second trial, F(1, 58)15.44, pB.0001, the third trial, F(1,
58)15.44, pB.0001, and the fourth trial, F(1, 58)18.86, pB.0001 (cf.
Figure 2).
For the ratio definite references/total words, the results showed a main
effect of group, F(1, 58)17.43, pB.0001. This ratio was higher for HC
participants than for SZ participants. There was also a main effect of trial,
F(3, 174)51.86, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the ratio was lower
in the first trial than in the second, third, and fourth trials ( pB.0001). The
ratio was also lower in the second trial than in the third and fourth trials
( pB.0001). No difference was found between the third and fourth trials
( p.05). The GroupTrial interaction was also significant, F(3, 174)
4.41, pB.005. This interaction was decomposed by trial. There was
a significant difference between the two groups on all trials: first trial,
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F(1, 58)6.59, p.01; second, F(1, 58)12.81, pB.001; third, F(1, 58)
12.24, pB.001; fourth, F(1, 58)14.21; pB.0001 (cf. Figure 2).
To sum up, there was no difference between the HC and SZ groups based
on the total number of words. SZ participants needed marginally more
speaking turns than HC participants. However, the number of speaking
turns decreases in the same way for both groups from the first to the fourth
trial. There was an effect of type of trial for all dependent variables, meaning
that participants’ performance was different in the first trial from in the
other trials. Taking into account the total number of words used, SZ
participants used the same number of indefinite references as HC
participants in the first trial while they differed in the other trials. They
also differed from HC participants in all trials for the number of definite
references they used.
Second level of complexity. A 24 repeated measure ANOVA for
Group (SZ, HC)Trial (first trial, second trial, third trial, fourth trial)
was performed on each dependent variable: total number of words, number
of speaking turns, ratio indefinite references/total words, and ratio definite
references/total words.
For the total number of words, the results showed a main effect of trial,
F(3, 174)50.32, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the differences
between each pair of trials were significant ( pB.0001) except between the
third and the fourth trial ( p.05). This means that the total number of
words produced by participants decreases continuously from the first trial to
the third trial. There was no main effect of group, F(1, 58)0.61, p.05.
The GroupTrial interaction was significant, F(3, 174)4.64, pB.004.
This interaction was decomposed according to trial. There was no
significant difference between the two groups on the first trial, F(1, 58)
1.72, p.05, but differences were found between the two groups on the
second trial, F(1, 58)9.16, pB.004, the third trial, F(1, 58)8.85,
pB.004, and the fourth trial, F(1, 58)11.39, pB.001.
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Figure 2. Ratios of indefinite and definite references per total words for SZ and HC participants at
the first level of complexity. *Indicates significant differences.
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TABLE 2
Group mean performance in the referential communication task at the first and second levels of complexity
Schizophrenia Healthy control
Mean SD Mean SD
First level of complexity
Total number of words 1st trial 147.4 113.2 164.0 136.7
2nd trial 68.5 59.8 50.0 24.7
3rd trial 58.8 48.7 37.2 17.0
4th trial 44.2 30.6 35.2 17.8
Number of speaking turns 1st trial 11.4 6.4 9.1 5.4
2nd trial 6.3 3.7 5.0 0.8
3rd trial 6.1 2.2 4.8 0.8
4th trial 5.5 1.3 4.8 0.8
Misunderstanding (Number of answers/requests for clarification) 1st trial 75/82 38/39
2nd trial 10/10 2/2
3rd trial 12/15 0
4th trial 5/5 0
Second level of complexity
Total number of words 1st trial 162.3 106.4 212.6 179.9
2nd trial 86.2 56.4 50.3 26.3
3rd trial 66.4 50.1 36.1 17.8
4th trial 58.5 36.2 33.0 15.7
Number of speaking turns 1st trial 11.0 1.5 10.7 1.6
2nd trial 6.8 0.4 5.1 0.4
3rd trial 6.2 0.4 4.8 0.4
4th trial 6.1 0.4 4.8 0.4
Misunderstanding (Number of answers/requests for clarification) 1st trial 69/77 35/36
2nd trial 8/9 1/1
3rd trial 8/9 0
4th trial 6/6 0
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For the total number of speaking turns, the results showed a main effect
of trial, F(1, 58)22.54, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the
differences were significant between the first trial and the three others
( pB.0001). There was no main effect of group, F(3, 174)2.59, p.05. The
GroupTrial interaction was not significant, F(3, 174)0.31, p.05 (cf.
Table 2).
For the ratio indefinite references/total words, the results showed a main
effect of group, F(1, 58)20.36, pB.0001. The ratio was higher for SZ than
for HC participants. There was also a main effect of trial, F(3, 174)27.51,
pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the ratio was higher in the first trial
than in the second, third, or fourth trial ( pB.0001). The ratio was also
higher in the second trial than in the third trial ( pB.05) or the fourth trial
( pB.001). No difference was found between the third and fourth trials ( p
.05). The GroupTrial interaction was also significant, F(3, 174)13.22,
pB.0001. This interaction was decomposed by trial. There was no
significant difference between the two groups on the first trial, F(1, 58)
2.57, p.05, but differences were found between the two groups on the
second, F(1, 58)18.19, pB.0001, third, F(1, 58)22.06, pB.0001, and
fourth trials, F(1, 58)23.25, pB.0001 (cf. Figure 3).
For the ratio definite references/total words, the results showed a main
effect of group, F(1, 58)26.19, pB.0001. The ratio was higher for HC
participants than for SZ participants. There was also a main effect of trial,
F(3, 174)71.54, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the ratio was lower
in the first trial than in the second, third, or fourth trial ( pB.0001). The
ratio was also lower in the second trial than in the third or fourth trial
( pB.0001). No difference was found between the third and fourth trials
( p.05). The GroupTrial interaction was also significant, F(3, 174)
10.73, pB.0001. This interaction was decomposed by trial. There was
significant difference between the two groups on the second trial, F(1, 58)
20.70, pB.0001, the third trial, F(1, 58)19.96, pB.0001, and the fourth
trial, F(1, 58)23.87, pB.0001. The difference between the two groups on
the first trial was significant, F(1, 58)4.23, pB.05 (cf. Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Ratios of indefinite and definite references per total words for SZ and HC participants at
the second level of complexity. *Indicates significant differences.
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In summary, results were similar to those found at the first level of
complexity for the dependent variables: speaking turns, number of indefinite
references, and number of definite references. However, at this level of
complexity, SZ participants used more words than HC participants in the
second, third, and fourth trials by contrast to the first trial.
Analyses were also performed by separating patients treated with
clozapine from others. No difference was found between refractory patients
treated and stable with clozapine and the others.
Misunderstanding. Statistical analyses were only performed on the first
trial for the first and second levels of complexity since no demands for
clarification were needed in the HC group in the other trials, unlike the
situation with SZ participants (cf. Table 2). The results showed a difference
between groups for requests for information at the first level of complexity,
t(56)2.29, pB.05, and the second level of complexity, t(54)2.65, pB.01.
Differences were found for answers to these requests at the first level of
complexity, t(43)2.7, pB.01, but not at the second level of complexity,
t(44)0.66, p.05. These results mean that more requests for clarification
were made with SZ participants than with HC participants and that SZ
participants provided fewer answers than HC participants to requests for
clarification at the first level of complexity.
Relationship between comic-strip and referential communication
task
To determine if the same participants performed more poorly on the
referential communication task and the comic-strip task, a median split of
the SZ data into relatively unimpaired (SZ-U) versus relatively impaired
(SZ-I) on the Comic-Strip task was used. A 24 repeated measure ANOVA
for Group (SZ-U, SZ-I)Trial (first trial, second trial, third trial, fourth
trial) was performed on the ratio indefinite references/total words, and on
the ratio definite references/total words in the first and second level of
complexity since these dependant variables best reflect ToM ability. SZ-I
group (n14) contained participants’ performances under the median (23)
while SZ-U group (n13) contained participants’ performances over the
median. Participants’ performances equal to the median (n4) were
excluded from the analyses.
First level of complexity. For the ratio indefinite references/total words,
the results showed a main effect of group, F(1, 25)9.79, pB.005. The ratio
was higher for SZ-I than for SZ-U participants. There was no main effect of
trial, F(3, 75)1.39, p.05). The GroupTrial interaction was significant,
F(3, 75)4.93, pB.004. This interaction was decomposed by trial. There
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was no significant difference between the two groups on the first trial,
F(1, 25)0.47, p.05, but differences were found between the two groups
on the second, F(1, 25)7.40, pB.01, third, F(1, 25)10.75, pB.003, and
fourth trials F(1, 25)8.93, pB.006 (cf. Figure 4).
For the ratio definite references/total words, the results showed a main
effect of group, F(1, 25)8.12, pB.009. The ratio was higher for SZ-U
participants than for SZ-I participants. There was a main effect of trial,
F(3, 75)17.65, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the ratio was lower in
the first trial than in the second ( pB.001), third, or fourth trial ( pB.0001).
The ratio was also lower in the second trial than in the third ( pB.008) or
fourth trial ( pB.02). No difference was found between the third and fourth
trials ( p.05). The GroupTrial interaction was marginally significant,
F(3, 75)2.63, p.05. This interaction was decomposed by trial. There was
no significant difference between the two groups on the second trial, F(1,
25)3.86, pB.06, but differences were found between the two groups on the
first, F(1, 25)6.12, pB.02, third, F(1, 25)5.70, pB.025, and fourth
trials, F(1, 25)9.05, pB.006 (cf. Figure 4).
Second level of complexity. For the ratio indefinite references/total
words, the results showed no main effect of group, F(1, 25)0.84, p.05,
and no main effect of trial, F(3, 75)1.62, p.05. The GroupTrial
interaction was not significant, F(3, 75)1.22, p .05.
For the ratio definite references/total words, the results showed no main
effect of group, F(1, 25)1.30, p.05. There was a main effect of trial,
F(3, 75)12.07, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the ratio was lower in
the first trial than in the second ( pB.01), third ( pB.002), or fourth trials
( pB.0001). The ratio was also lower in the second trial than in the third
( pB.006) or fourth trials ( pB.002). No difference was found between the
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Figure 4. Ratios of indefinite and definite references per total words for SZ-I and SZ-U participants
at the first and second level of complexity. SZ-I: SZ participants relatively impaired on the comic-strip
task; SZ-U: SZ participants relatively unimpaired on the comic-strip task. *Indicates significant
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third and fourth trials ( p.05). The GroupTrial interaction was not
significant, F(3, 75)0.81, p.05.
In summary, in the first level of complexity, taking into account the total
number of words used, SZ participants relatively unimpaired, and SZ
participants relatively impaired on the comic-strip task used the same
number of indefinite references in the first trial while they differed in the
other trials. They also differed in the first, third, and fourth trials for the
number of definite references they used. No difference was found between
the two SZ subgroups in the second level of complexity.
Correlation between Theory of Mind and symptoms
There was no significant correlation (Spearman correlation) between the
performances of SZ patients on theory of mind tasks and any symptoms
assessed by the PANSS.
Post hoc analyses
An analysis of content was performed to determine if participants might
have trouble remembering information they used in a previous trial due to a
memory problem rather than an inadequate use of indefinite references to
mark information. The number of new versus old descriptions used to
describe figures was measured for each trial. To determine if a description
was new or old, each trial was compared with the previous ones (second
versus first trial, third versus second and first trial, fourth versus third,
second, and first trial). Descriptions were counted as new when they had
never been used by the participants in the previous trials, and counted as old
when they had already been used in one or more of the previous trials. New
descriptions were never found to be associated with a definite reference in
either SZ participants or HC participants.
Content analysis
A 24 repeated measure ANOVA Type of description (new, old)Trial
(first trial, second trial, third trial, fourth trial) was performed on the
number of descriptions in the first and second level of complexity for each
group.
First level of complexity. For HC participants, the results showed a main
effect of trial, F(3, 84)19.07, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the
number of descriptions was higher in the first trial than the second, third and
fourth trials ( pB.0001). The number of descriptions was also higher in the
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second trial than the third ( pB.01) and fourth trials ( pB.004). The number
of descriptions was also higher in the third trial than the fourth ( pB.025).
There was no main effect of the type of descriptions, F(1, 28)3.31, p.05.
The Type of descriptionTrial interaction was significant, F(3, 84)43.06,
pB.0001. This interaction was decomposed by trial. There were significantly
more new descriptions than old descriptions on the first trial ( pB.0001),
whereas there were significantly more old than new descriptions on the
second ( pB.0001), third ( pB.0001), and fourth trials ( pB.0001).
For SZ participants, the results showed a main effect of trial, F(3, 90)
25.84, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the number of descriptions was
higher in the first trial than the second, third, and fourth trials ( pB.0001).
The number of descriptions was also higher in the second trial than the
fourth trial ( pB.01). The number of descriptions was also higher in the third
trial than the fourth trial ( pB.01). No difference was found between the
second and third trials ( p.05). There was no main effect of the type of
descriptions, F(1, 30)0.48, p.05. The Type of descriptionTrial
interaction was significant, F(3, 90)72.97, pB.0001. This interaction
was decomposed by trial. There were significantly more new descriptions
than old descriptions on the first trial ( pB.0001), whereas there were
significantly more old than new descriptions on the second ( pB.0001), third
( pB.0001), and fourth trials ( pB.0001).
Second level of complexity. For HC participants, the results showed a
main effect of trial, F(3, 84)24.68, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that
the number of descriptions was higher in the first trial than the second, third,
and fourth trials ( pB.0001). The number of descriptions was also higher in
the second trial than the third ( pB.006) and fourth trials ( pB.0001). No
difference was found between the third and fourth trials ( p.05). There was
a main effect of the type of descriptions, F(1, 28)6.30, pB.02. The Type of
description Trial interaction was significant, F(3, 84)56.12, pB.0001.
This interaction was decomposed by trial. There were significantly more new
descriptions than old descriptions on the first trial ( p B. 0001), whereas
there were significantly more old than new descriptions on the second
( pB.0001), third ( pB.0001), and fourth trials ( pB.0001).
For SZ participants, the results showed a main effect of trial, F(3, 90)
21.89, pB.0001. Tukey’s HSD revealed that the number of descriptions was
higher in the first trial than the second, third, and fourth trials ( pB.0001).
The number of descriptions was also higher in the second trial than the third
( pB.004) and fourth trials ( pB.001). No difference was found between the
third and fourth trials ( p.05). There was no main effect of the type of
descriptions, F(1, 30)0.02, p.05. The Type of descriptionTrial
interaction was significant, F(3, 90)119.80, pB.0001. This interaction
was decomposed by trial. There were significantly more new descriptions
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than old descriptions on the first trial ( pB. 0001), whereas there was
significantly more old than new descriptions on the second ( pB.0001), third
( pB.0001), and fourth trials ( pB.0001).
These results mean that both SZ and HC participants used more old than
new descriptions in the second, third, and fourth trials (cf. Figure 5).
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed to determine whether SZ individuals present ToM
impairments when they are assessed in a natural situation of conversation
compared to a classical nonverbal ToM task. To this end, the referential
communication paradigm was used, with four repetitions of the exchange
between the same interlocutors. This task allowed us to capture the dynamic
and social nature of a verbal interaction.
The main results showed that SZ participants performed worse than HC
participants on both the classical nonverbal ToM task and the referential
communication task.
Focusing on the referential communication task, the main results
indicated that SZ participants had problems using information they shared
with the experimenter. They seemed to use the same descriptions throughout
the exchanges as if they were not attributing knowledge (knowledge acquired
during previous exchanges) to the experimenter. As expected, no difference
in performance was found between the two groups of subjects on the first
trial; that represents square one of the exchange when the interlocutors have
no shared knowledge. The number of words, speaking turns, and indefinite
references decreased, whereas definite references increased over the following
trials. However, these changes due to the repetition of the exchange in the
following trials were smaller in the SZ group than the HC group with regard
to the number of words, indefinite, and definite references. SZ participants
exhibited a tendency to ineffectively mark the information they used. More
specifically, in comparison to the HC group, the number of indefinite
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Figure 5. Number of new and old descriptions used by SZ and HC participants at the first and
second level of complexity.
18
references did not decrease and the number of definite references increased
only slowly across the trials in the SZ group. SZ participants used fewer
definite references and more indefinite references than HC participants from
the first to the fourth trial. This means that they used indefinite articles for
marking old information and definite articles for new information, unlike
the HC participants. This interpretation was confirmed by the results of the
content analysis. This analysis enabled us to exclude the hypothesis of
memory problems according to which worse performances of SZ partici-
pants may reflect difficulties in their ability to encode and recall mutually
agreed descriptions across trials rather than genuine ToM problems. Indeed,
SZ participants used significantly more old descriptions than new in the
second, third, and fourth trials, as healthy participants did, meaning that
they continued to use the same descriptions across trials. As a consequence,
SZ participants seemed to remember the descriptions they used in previous
trials but they used inadequate references to mark them.
All these results indicate that SZ participants did not use referential
markers in an appropriate way, in connection with accessibility that the
referent is assumed to have in the listener’s mental discourse representation
(cf. Ariel’s, 1990, 1996, accessibility model). Interestingly, these results are
very much in contrast with those of HC participants who used indefinite
references to effectively mark new information and definite references for old
information for which an agreement had previously been reached between
the interlocutors. This result is expected both by the collaborative model
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) and the interactive alignment model (Pick-
ering & Garrod, 2004). The HC group’s results also agreed with the
prediction that many more words and speaking turns would be needed to
reach acceptance the first time than the subsequent times the interlocutors
encountered a figure, meaning that the collaborative process aiming at
mutual understanding was actually achieved.
An impairment in attributing shared knowledge to the experimenter was
confirmed by the results related to misunderstandings. Requests for
clarification and supplementary information were necessary in all the trials
with SZ participants, whereas they were made to HC participants only in the
first trial when the exchange was complex and included several descriptions.
In other words, the fact that SZ participants used indefinite references to
mark old information and that they did not reuse referential expressions for
which an agreement had been reached with the experimenter in subsequent
trials, induced ambiguity. And this ambiguity led the experimenter to ask SZ
participants for clarification in the second, third, and fourth trials.
Focusing on the relationship between the referential communication task
and the comic-strip task, comparisons within schizophrenia group (SZ-U vs.
SZ-I) revealed that in the first level of complexity, SZ participants relatively
impaired (SZ-I) on the comic-strip task were those who performed more
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poorly on the referential communication task. This relationship between
these two tasks showed the known heterogeneity existing among SZ
participants and supports the hypothesis that the referential communication
task is a good paradigm to study ToM ability during conversation since
participants who performed worse on the comic-strip task also performed
worse on the referential communication task.
The effect of complexity
The same types of performance concerning definite and indefinite references
were found at both levels of figure complexity. However, the increase in the
figures’ complexity meant that SZ participants used more words than HC
participants in the second, third, and fourth trials at the second level of
complexity. There was no difference in terms of speaking turns. Verbal
exchanges were longer with SZ participants than with HC participants at the
second level of complexity probably because more collaborative effort is
required when referring to figures that are harder to name and harder to tell
apart.
This difference in the number of words at the two levels of complexity may
result from the fact that SZ participants seemed to use more of a segmental
perspective than a holistic perspective to describe the figures at the second
level of complexity. The segmental perspective entails describing each figure
in terms of juxtaposed geometric parts and relations (e.g., ‘‘there are two
triangles on the top, and a square on the left . . .’’). The holistic perspective
involves describing each figure as a whole (e.g., ‘‘it looks like a fish’’). Figures
that were difficult to name elicited less holistic perspectives than figures that
were easy to name (Hupet et al., 1991). However, even though SZ
participants used a segmental perspective, this did not account for their
difficulty attributing and using shared knowledge. It merely led to longer
exchanges with the experimenter than the HC participants engaged in.
Interestingly, a difference between performances concerning definite and
indefinite references in the first and second level of complexity was revealed
when comparing subgroups of SZ participants relatively impaired and
relatively unimpaired on the comic-strip task. Indeed, SZ participants
relatively impaired on the comic-strip task performed worse than relatively
unimpaired SZ participants in their use of definite and indefinite references
in the first level of complexity, although no difference was found in the
second level of complexity. This lack of difference between SZ-I and SZ-U
subgroups in the second level of complexity suggested that when figures’
complexity increased SZ participants relatively unimpaired on the comic-
strip task showed a more marked inadequate use of reference markers,
leading to a similar performance level of relatively impaired SZ participants.
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Finally, the results of our study do not confirm those of McCabe et al.
(2004). Although the task we used was less cognitively demanding than
classical ToM tasks, the SZ individuals presented ToM difficulties, unlike the
SZ group studied by McCabe et al.The difference was probably due to the
methodology we used. In sum, our results do not support the hypothesis that
ToM impairments of SZ individuals might be due to a task demand effect, as
was suggested by McCabe et al., for example.
In conclusion, this study showed that individuals with schizophrenia find
it difficult to judge and attribute mental states such as shared knowledge in a
natural conversation. The referential communication task appears to be a
relevant paradigm for studying ToM ability in schizophrenia since it is less
complex than classical ToM tasks and much closer to what happens in the
reality of daily interactions.
REFERENCES
Ariel, M. (1990). Accessing noun-phrase antecedents. London: Routledge.
Ariel, M. (1996). Referring expressions and the / coreference distinction. In F. Gundel (Ed.),
Reference and referent accessibility. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Baron-Cohen, S., O’Riordan, M., Stone, V., Jones, R., & Plaisted, K. (1999). Recognition of faux
pas by normally developing children and children with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning
autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29(5), 407418.
Brune, M. (2005). ‘‘Theory of mind’’ in schizophrenia: A review of the literature. Schizophrenia
Bulletin, 31(1), 2142.
Brune, M., Abdel-Hamid, M., Lehmkamper, C., & Sonntag, C. (2007). Mental state attribution,
neurocognitive functioning, and psychopathology: What predicts poor social competence in
schizophrenia best? Schizophrenia Research, 92(13), 151159.
Champagne-Lavau, M., Charest, A., Blouin, G., & Rodriguez, J. P. (2008). Does contextual
information cue comprehension of speaker intent in schizophrenia? European Psychiatry, 23,
107.
Champagne-Lavau, M., Stip, E., & Joanette, Y. (2006). Social cognition deficit in schizophrenia:
Accounting for pragmatic deficits in communication abilities? Current Psychiatry Reviews, 2(3),
309315.
Chantraine, Y., Joanette, Y., & Ska, B. (1998). Conversational abilities in patients with right
hemisphere damage. Journal of Neurolinguistics, 11(12), 2132.
Clark, H. H., & Wilkes-Gibbs, D. (1986). Referring as a collaborative process. Cognition, 22(1),
139.
Corcoran, R., & Frith, C. D. (2003). Autobiographical memory and theory of mind: Evidence of a
relationship in schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 33(5), 897905.
Corcoran, R., Mercer, G., & Frith, C. D. (1995). Schizophrenia, symptomatology and social
inference: Investigating ‘‘theory of mind’’ in people with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research,
17(1), 513.
Cornish, F. (1999). Anaphora, discourse and understanding. Evidence from English and French.
Oxford, UK: Oxford Linguistics, Clarendon Press.
21
Docherty, N. M., Cohen, A. S., Nienow, T. M., Dinzeo, T. J., & Dangelmaier, R. E. (2003). Stability
of formal thought disorder and referential communication disturbances in schizophrenia.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112(3), 469475.
Docherty, N. M., Hall, M. J., Gordinier, S. W., & Cutting, L. P. (2000). Conceptual sequencing and
disordered speech in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 26(3), 723735.
Fossard, M., & Rigalleau, F. (2005). Referential accessibility and anaphor resolution: The case of
the French hybrid demonstrative pronoun celui-ci/celle-ci. In A. Branco, T. McEnery, & R.
Mitkov (Eds.), Anaphora processing: Linguistic, cognitive and computational modelling
(pp. 283300). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Garrod, S., & Anderson, A. (1987). Saying what you mean in dialogue: A study in conceptual and
semantic co-ordination. Cognition, 27(2), 181218.
Happe, F., Brownell, H., & Winner, E. (1999). Acquired ‘‘theory of mind’’ impairments following
stroke. Cognition, 70(3), 211240.
Harrington, L., Langdon, R., Siegert, R. J., & McClure, J. (2005). Schizophrenia, theory of mind,
and persecutory delusions. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10(2), 87104.
Harrington, L., Siegert, R. J., & McClure, J. (2005). Theory of mind in schizophrenia: A critical
review. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10(4), 249286.
Hupet, M., Seron, X., & Chantraine, Y. (1991). The effects of the codability and discriminability of
the referents on the collaborative referring procedure. British Journal of Psychology, 82,
449462.
Isaac, E. A., & Clark, H. H. (1987). References in conversation between experts and novices.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 116, 2637.
Janssen, I., Krabbendam, L., Jolles, J., & van Os, J. (2003). Alterations in theory of mind in patients
with schizophrenia and non-psychotic relatives. Acta Psychiatria Scandinavia, 108(2), 110117.
Kay, S. R., Fiszbein, A., & Opler, L. A. (1987). The positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS)
for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13, 261276.
Langdon, R., Coltheart, M., & Ward, P. B. (2006). Empathetic perspective-taking is impaired in
schizophrenia: Evidence from a study of emotion attribution and theory of mind. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 11(2), 133155.
Langdon, R., Coltheart, M., Ward, P. B., & Catts, S. V. (2001). Mentalising, executive planning and
disengagement in schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 6, 81108.
Langdon, R., Coltheart, M., Ward, P. B., & Catts, S. V. (2002). Disturbed communication in
schizophrenia: The role of poor pragmatics and poor mind-reading. Psychological Medicine,
32(7), 12731284.
Langdon, R., Michie, P. T., Ward, P. B., McConaghy, N., Catts, S. V., & Coltheart, M. (1997).
Defective self and/or other mentalising in schizophrenia: A cognitive neuropsychological
approach. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2(3), 167193.
Lee, K. H., Farrow, T. F., Spence, S. A., & Woodruff, P. W. (2004). Social cognition, brain networks
and schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 34(3), 391400.
McCabe, R., Leudar, I., & Antaki, C. (2004). Do people with schizophrenia display theory of mind
deficits in clinical interactions? Psychological Medicine, 34(3), 401412.
Mitchley, N. J., Berber, J., Gray, J. M., Brooks, D. N., & Livingston, M. G. (1998). Comprehension
of irony in schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 3, 127138.
Nelson, H. E. (1982). National Adult Reading Test (NART): Test manual. Windsor, UK: NFER-
Nelson.
Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2004). Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 27(2), 169190; discussion 190226.
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? The behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 4, 515526.
22
Randall, F., Corcoran, R., Day, J. C., & Bentall, R. P. (2003). Attention, theory of mind, and causal
attributions in people with persecutory delusions: A preliminary investigation. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 8(4), 287294.
Rochester, S., & Martin, J. R. (1979). Crazy talk: A study of the discourse of schizophrenic speakers.
New York: Plenum.
Russell, T. A., Reynaud, E., Herba, C., Morris, R., & Corcoran, R. (2006). Do you see what I see?
Interpretations of intentional movement in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 81(1),
101111.
Sarfati, Y., Hardy-Bayle, M. C., Besche, C., & Widlocher, D. (1997). Attribution of intentions to
others in people with schizophrenia: A non-verbal exploration with comic strips. Schizophrenia
Research, 25(3), 199209.
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Shur, S., Barcai-Goodman, L., Medlovich, S., Harari, H., & Levkovitz, Y.
(2007). Dissociation of cognitive from affective components of theory of mind in schizophrenia.
Psychiatry Research, 149(13), 1123.
Stewart, S. L., Corcoran, R., & Drake, R. J. (2008). Alignment and theory of mind in
schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 13(5), 431448.
Stip, E. (2006). [Cognition, schizophrenia and the effect of antipsychotics]. Encephale, 32(3, Pt. 1),
341350.
23
